뇌물 받고 ‘보안 1등급’ 자료 브로커에 유출···LH 전 간부 징역 8년, 법정구속
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뇌물을 받고 ‘보안 1등급’의 LH(한국토지주택공사)의 내부 정보를 브로커에 제공한 LH 인천지역본부 전 간부가 중형을 선고받고 법정구속됐다. 이 간부 주도로 LH가 매입한 미분양 주택은 인천지역 전세사기에도 이용됐다.
인천지법 형사12부(최영각 부장판사)는 20일 열린 선고공판에서 특정범죄가중처벌법상 뇌물수수와 업무상 배임 혐의 등으로 기소된 LH 인천본부 전 부장 A씨(48)에게 징역 8년과 벌금 3억원을 선고했다. 또 8000여만원의 추징을 명령했다.
변호사법 위반과 뇌물공여 등 혐의로 함께 기소된 브로커 B씨(34)도 징역 8년을 선고했다.
앞서 검찰은 지난해 11월 열린 결심공판에서 A씨에게는 징역 8년, B씨에게는 징역 9년을 각각 구형했다.
재판부는 “A씨가 누설한 자료는 접근권한 1등급 문서로 업무상 비밀이 분명하다”며 “어떻게 이렇게 과감하게 행동할 수 있는지 의문을 품고 사건 기록을 봤다”고 설명했다.
이어 “A씨는 비공개 자료를 B씨에게 주고 편의를 제공하는 등 공공기관 직원으로서 죄질이 좋지 않다”며 “다만 형사처벌 전력 없는 초범인 점을 고려했다”고 양형 이유를 밝혔다.
B씨에 대해서도 “A씨에게 8000만원이 넘는 향응을 제공하고, LH의 약정주택 매입 여부를 결정할 수 있는 것처럼 건축주들에게 과시해 99억원이 넘는 돈을 받거나 받기로 약속했다”며 “누범 기간 중 범행했으나 지병이 있는 점 등을 고려했다”고 밝혔다.
A씨는 2019년 11월부터 2021년 5월까지 LH 내부 자료를 제공하는 대가로 B씨로부터 35회에 걸쳐 8673만원 상당의 금품과 향응을 받은 혐의로 기소됐다. 매입임대주택 업무를 맡았던 A씨는 B씨에게 LH 인천본부의 감정평가 총괄자료를 16차례 제공했다. 이 자료는 임대주택 현황과 감정평가 결과 등이 담긴 보안 1등급 정보였다.
B씨는 미분양 주택을 신속하게 처분하려는 건축주들에게 A씨를 소개해 주는 대가로 29회에 걸쳐 99억4000만원 상당의 청탁·알선료를 수수하거나 약속받은 것으로 조사됐다.
이들의 범행을 통해 LH 인천본부가 3303억원을 들여 매입한 주택은 모두 1800여채이며, 이 중에는 전세사기 일당 소유의 미분양 주택 165채도 포함됐다.
A씨는 2021년 5월 파면됐다.
이재명 대통령은 21일 검찰개혁 입법 쟁점인 공소청 보완수사권 부여를 두고 “보완수사를 안 하는 게 맞는다고 생각하지만 예외적으로 필요한 경우가 있다”고 말했다. 이혜훈 기획예산처 장관 후보자 거취는 “아직 결정하지 못했다”며 “국민의 판단을 들어볼 기회마저 봉쇄돼 아쉽다”고 했다. 이 대통령은 대전·충남, 광주·전남 행정통합은 “반드시 성공시켜야 할 국가 생존 전략”이라고 했다.
이 대통령은 이날 청와대 영빈관에서 연 신년 기자회견에서 이같이 밝혔다. 이 대통령 취임 후 세 번째 기자회견이다.
이 대통령은 검찰개혁 방향을 두고 “국민의 삶을 저해하는 반칙과 특권, 불공정은 단호히 바로잡겠다”며 “검찰개혁 역시 확실하게 추진하겠다”고 밝혔다. 이 대통령은 “검찰개혁 핵심은 검찰에서 권력을 빼앗는 것이 아니다. 최종 목표는 국민의 권리 구제와 인권 보호”라며 “논쟁이 두려워 검사의 모든 권력을 완전히 빼앗는 방식으로 해놓으면 나중에 책임은 어떻게 질 것이냐”고 말했다.
이 대통령은 보완수사권을 공소청에 부여하는 문제에 대해 예외적 필요성을 언급하며 “남용의 가능성을 봉쇄하되, 효율성이 제거돼서도 안 된다”며 “그래서 숙의하자, 시간을 충분히 갖고 감정적으로 하지 말자는 것”이라고 했다.
이 대통령은 이 후보자에 대해서는 “문제가 있어 보이긴 한다”며 “청문회를 할 수 있으면 좋겠는데 시간을 두고 판단하겠다”고 말했다. 청와대의 검증 미흡 비판에 대해서는 “보좌관에게 갑질했는지 어떻게 아느냐”며 “그쪽 진영에서 5번 공천받고 3번 국회의원 당선된 분”이라고 했다.
이 대통령은 남북관계에 대해서는 “우발 충돌을 방지하고 정치·군사적 신뢰를 구축하기 위해 9·19 군사합의를 복원해 나가겠다”고 밝혔다.
이 대통령은 광역단체 통합에 대해서는 “정치적 유불리에 따라 광역통합 방향이 흔들리는 일은 결코 없을 것”이라며 “충남·대전은 약간 반대 기류가 생겨나고 있는데, 전남·광주는 확실하게 될 것 같다”고 말했다.
이 대통령은 신규 원전 건설 문제를 두고는 “최근 추세를 보면 엄청난 에너지 수요가 있는 것은 사실”이라며 “필요한지, 안전한지, 국민 뜻은 어떤지 열어 놓고 판단하자는 생각”이라고 밝혔다.
이 대통령은 환율에 대해서는 “관련 책임 당국에 의하면 한두 달 정도 지나면 (1달러당) 1400원 전후로 떨어질 것이라 예측하고 있다”며 “지속적으로 가능한 수단을 발굴하고 환율이 안정되도록 노력하겠다”고 말했다. 이 대통령은 또 “몇조, 몇십조씩 혹시 적자 국채 발행해서 추경(추가경정예산)하는 거 아니냐는 걱정하는 사람들이 있던데, 그런 건 안 한다”고 말했다.
The past year, since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, has been a relentless succession of the unpredictable. He weaponized tariffs, turning them against allies as readily as adversaries. He invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to Alaska and greeted him like an old friend, and—defying his reputation as an “isolationist”—ordered airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump has given no one time to even take stock of his first year back in office. At the very start of the new year, he has launched an attack on Venezuela and is openly stoking ambitions to seize Greenland by force if necessary.
Asked to choose words that best describe the Trump administration’s foreign policy over the past year, Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, responded in an email interview with the Kyunghyang Daily News on January 19: “Thuggish. Extortionate. Frenzied. Myopic.” Wertheim is also a co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy, which Foreign Affairs selected as its “Book of the Year”.
Wertheim said that President Trump is “offering an enthusiastically naked imperialism,” adding that “even U.S. allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying.”
KYUNGHYANG: The operation to capture Nicolas Maduro came as a shock in that it appeared to mark a return to an era in which “might makes right.” What do you believe the Trump administration’s attack on Venezuela signifies for the international order?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s attack on Venezuela is hardly the first time the United States has used military force aggressively and in violation of international law. What is different is that Trump makes little-to-no attempt even to claim he’s acting for a higher principle. He says his main motive for turning gunboats on Caracas is to “take the oil.” I believe him. He is currently threatening to strike multiple countries and annex the sovereign territory of other states, including NATO allies. He may well do that.
When they went to war, Trump’s predecessors not only claimed to be improving the international order; they also believed what they said — perhaps to a fault. But if traditional U.S. presidents sometimes allowed liberal ordering to turn into liberal imperialism, Trump is offering enthusiastically naked imperialism.
For the world, Trump’s conduct means that power politics has become an inescapable reality. Weak countries can count on Trump to boss them around. Even American allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying. The effect on U.S. adversaries, namely China and Russia, remains to be seen; they don’t need America’s permission to act as they like. At a minimum, however, Trump has helped Beijing to present itself as the responsible steward of international order and more easily justify its own coercion, present and future. He has further lowered the bar Moscow needs to clear to appear less bad, in the eyes of many across the Global South, than the United States and the West.
KYUNGHYANG: President Trump has also suggested the possibility of using military force against Greenland. Following the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities and the apparent success of the Venezuela operation, some argue that Trump may have developed a sense of confidence — or even efficacy — in the use of military force. How far do you think he may be willing to expand the use of force going forward?
WERTHEIM: Trump is emboldened. He has ordered a succession of attacks that might have caused immediate blowback but didn’t — so far. The trend began with his assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in the last year of his first term. Now, in his second term, he has bombed Iran, blown up alleged drug boats in the Caribbean basin, and launched airstrikes in Syria and Nigeria, all before the raid to capture Maduro. Trump still prefers to take one-and-done military actions and avoid the commitment of ground forces. But he probably thinks that the doubters kept warning of risks, and each time he proved them wrong, avoiding the quagmires that bedeviled other presidents. I fear that his luck will run out, and he may order more and more ambitious operations.
KYUNGHYANG: Trump’s announcement of plans to impose tariffs on eight European Union countries that oppose the U.S. annexation of Greenland has pushed the transatlantic alliance into what many see as its gravest crisis to date. What do you believe the future holds for the transatlantic alliance and NATO?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s quest to annex Greenland has the potential not only to fracture the transatlantic alliance but to divide Europe as well. If Trump keeps intensifying pressure on Denmark to sell the territory, the European countries who rely the most on U.S. military protection may urge Copenhagen to appease Trump, while other European countries may find that prospect unconscionable. So Europe could effectively split into two camps, with the United States siding with one against the other.
However the Greenland affair turns out, NATO will never be the same. Major European countries, including France and Germany, have learned they cannot remain dependent on the United States — not under Trump and not after Trump. Not only is American power unreliable, but it is liable to turn into a dagger aimed at your heart. I can imagine several possible futures for the transatlantic alliance, but the next decade won’t look like the last.
KYUNGHYANG: For years, Latin America was treated as a low-priority region in major U.S. strategic documents. Yet in the Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy, the Western Hemisphere is designated as a top strategic priority. Why do you think the Trump administration, unlike previous administrations, is placing such emphasis on the Western Hemisphere?
WERTHEIM: Consider three levels: Trump, his administration, and the world.
Trump has all along felt that the most grievous threats to the United States traverse the nation’s borders. Immigrants, gangs, drugs, and even, less directly, trade — Trump securitizes these issues and prioritizes them above conventional military threats far away. That worldview has put Trump on a collision course with America’s hemispheric neighbors.
Yet it’s only in his second presidency that the Western Hemisphere has ascended to the top of U.S. strategic priorities. That’s because Trump has finally surrounded himself with likeminded or obedient advisers willing to implement his vision. In part because his vision is capacious, his administration contains several factions who compete over most areas of foreign policy. On the Western Hemisphere, however, the factions overlap. “Primacists” such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio can agree with “restrainers,” who favor U.S. military pullbacks overseas, that the United States should show greater concern with challenges close to home.
And now that the United States has lost a position of dominance in Europe and Asia, the Western Hemisphere has reemerged as a fresh-seeming terrain in which to wield American power. Trump prefers to deal with the weak, and Trump isn’t alone: the United States has sought to achieve uncontested global supremacy ever since the Cold War ended. Today Washington can no longer enjoy the same position worldwide, but it can dominate what the Trump administration calls “our hemisphere.”
KYUNGHYANG: Trump and the MAGA movement have long been described as isolationist. Yet Trump has intervened extensively abroad, calling into question whether that label remains analytically useful. He once appeared to approach the use of power like a businessman weighing costs and returns, but he now seems increasingly willing to assert power for its own sake. How would you characterize the underlying logic or strategy of Trump’s foreign policy?
WERTHEIM: Trump has never been an isolationist; he wants to take things from the world, not withdraw from it. Nor does Trump make careful calculations of costs and benefits. He has always been a showman more than a businessman, and as president, he is guided above all by the performance of power. He wants to tell Americans, the world, and perhaps himself that he is in control and getting his way. More specifically, he is performing his vision of “peace through strength,” which involves both ending armed conflicts and using military force in targeted ways to display American might.
The irony is that Trump is supposed to put “America first” in all things, yet he lacks a coherent account of what American interests are. At least the original so-called isolationists of 1940 and 1941 had an identifiable understanding of U.S. interests: they contended that so long as the United States kept outside powers out of the Western Hemisphere, North America would remain secure from attack. They were not necessarily wrong on that point, even though their prescription might have been terrible for the world. Trump, by contrast, chafes at the global commitments he has inherited but has yet to relinquish any of them.
KYUNGHYANG: The new National Security Strategy(NSS) does not contain systemic criticism of China or Russia. Some analysts note that this is the first NSS since 1988 that does not reference China’s authoritarianism even once. What do you think this shift signifies?
WERTHEIM: The National Security Strategy makes almost no distinction between democratic and authoritarian states. Under Trump’s predecessors, however, the United States has opposed Russia and China not only because they were authoritarian, but also, and mainly, because they threaten American primacy, including U.S. allies.
The new National Security Strategy does not take the accommodating view of China that some analysts have suggested. True, it avoids adversarial verbiage toward China. Yet it offers Beijing no concessions — nothing but the chance to accept coexistence on Washington’s terms. In particular, the document states that Taiwan is strategically and economically important to the United States and promises to “build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.” While it seems Trump wants to avoid needlessly antagonizing Beijing through rhetoric, U.S.-China competition is continuing.
KYUNGHYANG: But some experts argue that the era of hegemonic competition is coming to an end, and that the United States, China, and Russia may be moving toward a great-power arrangement that tacitly recognizes spheres of influence. Do you agree with this interpretation?
WERTHEIM: I essentially disagree. Trump has reclaimed America’s traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but that does not mean he’s willing to grant China or Russia spheres in their own regions. The normal hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy is: “spheres of influence for me, but not for thee.” If that hypocrisy hasn’t bothered other presidents, it certainly won’t bother Trump.
Trump has not offered to cede a sphere of influence to Beijing or Moscow in their regions. He hardly welcomed the expansion of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific. Trump has, of course, supported Russia’s demand to retain the territory it currently occupies in Ukraine, plus the rest of the Donetsk region, but in that case Trump seems to be attempting to reach a pragmatic end to the war rather than grant Russia a wider sphere of influence in eastern Europe or Central Asia.
In short, Trump is asserting American power globally, not pulling the United States back to its own hemisphere. That said, Trump may yet make some sort of deal over Taiwan or diminish U.S. defense responsibilities in Europe. He may also weaken the foundations that generate American power over the long term, including the country’s international attractiveness and state capacity. In a decades’ time, the United States may well have a more modest global military presence and fewer defense commitments. But even if that happens, the United States will remain a major security player in Asia and the Western Hemisphere at a minimum, and I doubt that Russia could rampage through much of eastern Europe.
KYUNGHYANG: North Korea is not mentioned even once in the new NSS. This has led to speculation in South Korea that the United States may have effectively accepted the practical impossibility of North Korean denuclearization and downgraded the priority of the nuclear issue. What is your assessment?
WERTHEIM: As Barack Obama left office a decade ago, he told Trump that North Korea was the most pressing threat the new president would face. Since Trump failed to make a nuclear deal with Kim Jong-un in 2019, North Korea has dropped far down Washington’s list of foreign policy priorities. The new National Security Strategy reflects that reality.
In my view, the United States has all but accepted the practical impossibility of fully denuclearizing North Korea, even though it hasn’t officially said so. There is no realistic scenario in which North Korea will decide to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.
The Biden administration effectively sought to strengthen deterrence and manage risk, not to advance toward denuclearization. Trump personally seems to want to return to the negotiating table with Kim Jong-un as part of his attempt to be the “president of peace.” But there are no signs of what Trump would be willing to offer Kim, and Kim’s asking price, if there is one, has gone up due to his partnership with Russia and distrust of the United States.
KYUNGHYANG: The new NSS emphasizes that the United States will no longer bear security burdens unilaterally, calling on allies to share responsibility. It specifically highlights the roles of South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific, including the defense of the First Island Chain. In the event of a contingency involving Taiwan, what strategic role does the United States expect South Korea to play?
WERTHEIM: I don’t think many people in the U.S. government expect South Korea to join a U.S.-led coalition to fight China. (Nor is it knowable whether the United States would fight China; “strategic ambiguity” isn’t just a policy but a real reflection of U.S. intention, or lack thereof.) Instead, South Korea would be expected to provide logistical support for allied forces and produce defense equipment to sustain the war effort. Most importantly, South Korea would need to assume the full burden of deterring North Korea even as some U.S. forces and assets on the Korean peninsula get diverted to the Taiwan theater.
KYUNGHYANG: I would like to ask about the Trump administration’s response to the recent tensions between China and Japan. While Prime Minister Takaichi’s comments about possible involvement in a Taiwan contingency may have been diplomatically awkward, they were broadly aligned with U.S. expectations regarding Japan’s security role. However, the Trump administration’s expressions of support for Japan were both muted in tone and notably delayed, giving the impression that Washington preferred to stand on the sidelines of this dispute.
WERTHEIM: The U.S. ambassador to Japan did express support for Japan and Takaichi, but Trump himself was muted. Trump’s response reflects his desire for stable relations with Beijing after the two countries had reached a fragile trade truce. In addition, Trump prefers to remain strictly ambiguous about how the United States itself would respond to a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. In the context of Taiwan as well as Ukraine, he seems to think it’s unwise for a weaker country to use inflammatory language that could provoke a stronger country. So it wouldn’t surprise me if Trump personally disapproved of Takaichi’s comments, which appeared to suggest that Japan would use military force if China used armed force to attack Taiwan.
Still, I don’t see a real change in U.S. policy so far. We’ll find out in the coming months if Trump and Xi are interested in reaching a new understanding about Taiwan.
인천지법 형사12부(최영각 부장판사)는 20일 열린 선고공판에서 특정범죄가중처벌법상 뇌물수수와 업무상 배임 혐의 등으로 기소된 LH 인천본부 전 부장 A씨(48)에게 징역 8년과 벌금 3억원을 선고했다. 또 8000여만원의 추징을 명령했다.
변호사법 위반과 뇌물공여 등 혐의로 함께 기소된 브로커 B씨(34)도 징역 8년을 선고했다.
앞서 검찰은 지난해 11월 열린 결심공판에서 A씨에게는 징역 8년, B씨에게는 징역 9년을 각각 구형했다.
재판부는 “A씨가 누설한 자료는 접근권한 1등급 문서로 업무상 비밀이 분명하다”며 “어떻게 이렇게 과감하게 행동할 수 있는지 의문을 품고 사건 기록을 봤다”고 설명했다.
이어 “A씨는 비공개 자료를 B씨에게 주고 편의를 제공하는 등 공공기관 직원으로서 죄질이 좋지 않다”며 “다만 형사처벌 전력 없는 초범인 점을 고려했다”고 양형 이유를 밝혔다.
B씨에 대해서도 “A씨에게 8000만원이 넘는 향응을 제공하고, LH의 약정주택 매입 여부를 결정할 수 있는 것처럼 건축주들에게 과시해 99억원이 넘는 돈을 받거나 받기로 약속했다”며 “누범 기간 중 범행했으나 지병이 있는 점 등을 고려했다”고 밝혔다.
A씨는 2019년 11월부터 2021년 5월까지 LH 내부 자료를 제공하는 대가로 B씨로부터 35회에 걸쳐 8673만원 상당의 금품과 향응을 받은 혐의로 기소됐다. 매입임대주택 업무를 맡았던 A씨는 B씨에게 LH 인천본부의 감정평가 총괄자료를 16차례 제공했다. 이 자료는 임대주택 현황과 감정평가 결과 등이 담긴 보안 1등급 정보였다.
B씨는 미분양 주택을 신속하게 처분하려는 건축주들에게 A씨를 소개해 주는 대가로 29회에 걸쳐 99억4000만원 상당의 청탁·알선료를 수수하거나 약속받은 것으로 조사됐다.
이들의 범행을 통해 LH 인천본부가 3303억원을 들여 매입한 주택은 모두 1800여채이며, 이 중에는 전세사기 일당 소유의 미분양 주택 165채도 포함됐다.
A씨는 2021년 5월 파면됐다.
이재명 대통령은 21일 검찰개혁 입법 쟁점인 공소청 보완수사권 부여를 두고 “보완수사를 안 하는 게 맞는다고 생각하지만 예외적으로 필요한 경우가 있다”고 말했다. 이혜훈 기획예산처 장관 후보자 거취는 “아직 결정하지 못했다”며 “국민의 판단을 들어볼 기회마저 봉쇄돼 아쉽다”고 했다. 이 대통령은 대전·충남, 광주·전남 행정통합은 “반드시 성공시켜야 할 국가 생존 전략”이라고 했다.
이 대통령은 이날 청와대 영빈관에서 연 신년 기자회견에서 이같이 밝혔다. 이 대통령 취임 후 세 번째 기자회견이다.
이 대통령은 검찰개혁 방향을 두고 “국민의 삶을 저해하는 반칙과 특권, 불공정은 단호히 바로잡겠다”며 “검찰개혁 역시 확실하게 추진하겠다”고 밝혔다. 이 대통령은 “검찰개혁 핵심은 검찰에서 권력을 빼앗는 것이 아니다. 최종 목표는 국민의 권리 구제와 인권 보호”라며 “논쟁이 두려워 검사의 모든 권력을 완전히 빼앗는 방식으로 해놓으면 나중에 책임은 어떻게 질 것이냐”고 말했다.
이 대통령은 보완수사권을 공소청에 부여하는 문제에 대해 예외적 필요성을 언급하며 “남용의 가능성을 봉쇄하되, 효율성이 제거돼서도 안 된다”며 “그래서 숙의하자, 시간을 충분히 갖고 감정적으로 하지 말자는 것”이라고 했다.
이 대통령은 이 후보자에 대해서는 “문제가 있어 보이긴 한다”며 “청문회를 할 수 있으면 좋겠는데 시간을 두고 판단하겠다”고 말했다. 청와대의 검증 미흡 비판에 대해서는 “보좌관에게 갑질했는지 어떻게 아느냐”며 “그쪽 진영에서 5번 공천받고 3번 국회의원 당선된 분”이라고 했다.
이 대통령은 남북관계에 대해서는 “우발 충돌을 방지하고 정치·군사적 신뢰를 구축하기 위해 9·19 군사합의를 복원해 나가겠다”고 밝혔다.
이 대통령은 광역단체 통합에 대해서는 “정치적 유불리에 따라 광역통합 방향이 흔들리는 일은 결코 없을 것”이라며 “충남·대전은 약간 반대 기류가 생겨나고 있는데, 전남·광주는 확실하게 될 것 같다”고 말했다.
이 대통령은 신규 원전 건설 문제를 두고는 “최근 추세를 보면 엄청난 에너지 수요가 있는 것은 사실”이라며 “필요한지, 안전한지, 국민 뜻은 어떤지 열어 놓고 판단하자는 생각”이라고 밝혔다.
이 대통령은 환율에 대해서는 “관련 책임 당국에 의하면 한두 달 정도 지나면 (1달러당) 1400원 전후로 떨어질 것이라 예측하고 있다”며 “지속적으로 가능한 수단을 발굴하고 환율이 안정되도록 노력하겠다”고 말했다. 이 대통령은 또 “몇조, 몇십조씩 혹시 적자 국채 발행해서 추경(추가경정예산)하는 거 아니냐는 걱정하는 사람들이 있던데, 그런 건 안 한다”고 말했다.
The past year, since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, has been a relentless succession of the unpredictable. He weaponized tariffs, turning them against allies as readily as adversaries. He invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to Alaska and greeted him like an old friend, and—defying his reputation as an “isolationist”—ordered airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump has given no one time to even take stock of his first year back in office. At the very start of the new year, he has launched an attack on Venezuela and is openly stoking ambitions to seize Greenland by force if necessary.
Asked to choose words that best describe the Trump administration’s foreign policy over the past year, Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, responded in an email interview with the Kyunghyang Daily News on January 19: “Thuggish. Extortionate. Frenzied. Myopic.” Wertheim is also a co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy, which Foreign Affairs selected as its “Book of the Year”.
Wertheim said that President Trump is “offering an enthusiastically naked imperialism,” adding that “even U.S. allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying.”
KYUNGHYANG: The operation to capture Nicolas Maduro came as a shock in that it appeared to mark a return to an era in which “might makes right.” What do you believe the Trump administration’s attack on Venezuela signifies for the international order?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s attack on Venezuela is hardly the first time the United States has used military force aggressively and in violation of international law. What is different is that Trump makes little-to-no attempt even to claim he’s acting for a higher principle. He says his main motive for turning gunboats on Caracas is to “take the oil.” I believe him. He is currently threatening to strike multiple countries and annex the sovereign territory of other states, including NATO allies. He may well do that.
When they went to war, Trump’s predecessors not only claimed to be improving the international order; they also believed what they said — perhaps to a fault. But if traditional U.S. presidents sometimes allowed liberal ordering to turn into liberal imperialism, Trump is offering enthusiastically naked imperialism.
For the world, Trump’s conduct means that power politics has become an inescapable reality. Weak countries can count on Trump to boss them around. Even American allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying. The effect on U.S. adversaries, namely China and Russia, remains to be seen; they don’t need America’s permission to act as they like. At a minimum, however, Trump has helped Beijing to present itself as the responsible steward of international order and more easily justify its own coercion, present and future. He has further lowered the bar Moscow needs to clear to appear less bad, in the eyes of many across the Global South, than the United States and the West.
KYUNGHYANG: President Trump has also suggested the possibility of using military force against Greenland. Following the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities and the apparent success of the Venezuela operation, some argue that Trump may have developed a sense of confidence — or even efficacy — in the use of military force. How far do you think he may be willing to expand the use of force going forward?
WERTHEIM: Trump is emboldened. He has ordered a succession of attacks that might have caused immediate blowback but didn’t — so far. The trend began with his assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in the last year of his first term. Now, in his second term, he has bombed Iran, blown up alleged drug boats in the Caribbean basin, and launched airstrikes in Syria and Nigeria, all before the raid to capture Maduro. Trump still prefers to take one-and-done military actions and avoid the commitment of ground forces. But he probably thinks that the doubters kept warning of risks, and each time he proved them wrong, avoiding the quagmires that bedeviled other presidents. I fear that his luck will run out, and he may order more and more ambitious operations.
KYUNGHYANG: Trump’s announcement of plans to impose tariffs on eight European Union countries that oppose the U.S. annexation of Greenland has pushed the transatlantic alliance into what many see as its gravest crisis to date. What do you believe the future holds for the transatlantic alliance and NATO?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s quest to annex Greenland has the potential not only to fracture the transatlantic alliance but to divide Europe as well. If Trump keeps intensifying pressure on Denmark to sell the territory, the European countries who rely the most on U.S. military protection may urge Copenhagen to appease Trump, while other European countries may find that prospect unconscionable. So Europe could effectively split into two camps, with the United States siding with one against the other.
However the Greenland affair turns out, NATO will never be the same. Major European countries, including France and Germany, have learned they cannot remain dependent on the United States — not under Trump and not after Trump. Not only is American power unreliable, but it is liable to turn into a dagger aimed at your heart. I can imagine several possible futures for the transatlantic alliance, but the next decade won’t look like the last.
KYUNGHYANG: For years, Latin America was treated as a low-priority region in major U.S. strategic documents. Yet in the Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy, the Western Hemisphere is designated as a top strategic priority. Why do you think the Trump administration, unlike previous administrations, is placing such emphasis on the Western Hemisphere?
WERTHEIM: Consider three levels: Trump, his administration, and the world.
Trump has all along felt that the most grievous threats to the United States traverse the nation’s borders. Immigrants, gangs, drugs, and even, less directly, trade — Trump securitizes these issues and prioritizes them above conventional military threats far away. That worldview has put Trump on a collision course with America’s hemispheric neighbors.
Yet it’s only in his second presidency that the Western Hemisphere has ascended to the top of U.S. strategic priorities. That’s because Trump has finally surrounded himself with likeminded or obedient advisers willing to implement his vision. In part because his vision is capacious, his administration contains several factions who compete over most areas of foreign policy. On the Western Hemisphere, however, the factions overlap. “Primacists” such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio can agree with “restrainers,” who favor U.S. military pullbacks overseas, that the United States should show greater concern with challenges close to home.
And now that the United States has lost a position of dominance in Europe and Asia, the Western Hemisphere has reemerged as a fresh-seeming terrain in which to wield American power. Trump prefers to deal with the weak, and Trump isn’t alone: the United States has sought to achieve uncontested global supremacy ever since the Cold War ended. Today Washington can no longer enjoy the same position worldwide, but it can dominate what the Trump administration calls “our hemisphere.”
KYUNGHYANG: Trump and the MAGA movement have long been described as isolationist. Yet Trump has intervened extensively abroad, calling into question whether that label remains analytically useful. He once appeared to approach the use of power like a businessman weighing costs and returns, but he now seems increasingly willing to assert power for its own sake. How would you characterize the underlying logic or strategy of Trump’s foreign policy?
WERTHEIM: Trump has never been an isolationist; he wants to take things from the world, not withdraw from it. Nor does Trump make careful calculations of costs and benefits. He has always been a showman more than a businessman, and as president, he is guided above all by the performance of power. He wants to tell Americans, the world, and perhaps himself that he is in control and getting his way. More specifically, he is performing his vision of “peace through strength,” which involves both ending armed conflicts and using military force in targeted ways to display American might.
The irony is that Trump is supposed to put “America first” in all things, yet he lacks a coherent account of what American interests are. At least the original so-called isolationists of 1940 and 1941 had an identifiable understanding of U.S. interests: they contended that so long as the United States kept outside powers out of the Western Hemisphere, North America would remain secure from attack. They were not necessarily wrong on that point, even though their prescription might have been terrible for the world. Trump, by contrast, chafes at the global commitments he has inherited but has yet to relinquish any of them.
KYUNGHYANG: The new National Security Strategy(NSS) does not contain systemic criticism of China or Russia. Some analysts note that this is the first NSS since 1988 that does not reference China’s authoritarianism even once. What do you think this shift signifies?
WERTHEIM: The National Security Strategy makes almost no distinction between democratic and authoritarian states. Under Trump’s predecessors, however, the United States has opposed Russia and China not only because they were authoritarian, but also, and mainly, because they threaten American primacy, including U.S. allies.
The new National Security Strategy does not take the accommodating view of China that some analysts have suggested. True, it avoids adversarial verbiage toward China. Yet it offers Beijing no concessions — nothing but the chance to accept coexistence on Washington’s terms. In particular, the document states that Taiwan is strategically and economically important to the United States and promises to “build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.” While it seems Trump wants to avoid needlessly antagonizing Beijing through rhetoric, U.S.-China competition is continuing.
KYUNGHYANG: But some experts argue that the era of hegemonic competition is coming to an end, and that the United States, China, and Russia may be moving toward a great-power arrangement that tacitly recognizes spheres of influence. Do you agree with this interpretation?
WERTHEIM: I essentially disagree. Trump has reclaimed America’s traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but that does not mean he’s willing to grant China or Russia spheres in their own regions. The normal hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy is: “spheres of influence for me, but not for thee.” If that hypocrisy hasn’t bothered other presidents, it certainly won’t bother Trump.
Trump has not offered to cede a sphere of influence to Beijing or Moscow in their regions. He hardly welcomed the expansion of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific. Trump has, of course, supported Russia’s demand to retain the territory it currently occupies in Ukraine, plus the rest of the Donetsk region, but in that case Trump seems to be attempting to reach a pragmatic end to the war rather than grant Russia a wider sphere of influence in eastern Europe or Central Asia.
In short, Trump is asserting American power globally, not pulling the United States back to its own hemisphere. That said, Trump may yet make some sort of deal over Taiwan or diminish U.S. defense responsibilities in Europe. He may also weaken the foundations that generate American power over the long term, including the country’s international attractiveness and state capacity. In a decades’ time, the United States may well have a more modest global military presence and fewer defense commitments. But even if that happens, the United States will remain a major security player in Asia and the Western Hemisphere at a minimum, and I doubt that Russia could rampage through much of eastern Europe.
KYUNGHYANG: North Korea is not mentioned even once in the new NSS. This has led to speculation in South Korea that the United States may have effectively accepted the practical impossibility of North Korean denuclearization and downgraded the priority of the nuclear issue. What is your assessment?
WERTHEIM: As Barack Obama left office a decade ago, he told Trump that North Korea was the most pressing threat the new president would face. Since Trump failed to make a nuclear deal with Kim Jong-un in 2019, North Korea has dropped far down Washington’s list of foreign policy priorities. The new National Security Strategy reflects that reality.
In my view, the United States has all but accepted the practical impossibility of fully denuclearizing North Korea, even though it hasn’t officially said so. There is no realistic scenario in which North Korea will decide to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.
The Biden administration effectively sought to strengthen deterrence and manage risk, not to advance toward denuclearization. Trump personally seems to want to return to the negotiating table with Kim Jong-un as part of his attempt to be the “president of peace.” But there are no signs of what Trump would be willing to offer Kim, and Kim’s asking price, if there is one, has gone up due to his partnership with Russia and distrust of the United States.
KYUNGHYANG: The new NSS emphasizes that the United States will no longer bear security burdens unilaterally, calling on allies to share responsibility. It specifically highlights the roles of South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific, including the defense of the First Island Chain. In the event of a contingency involving Taiwan, what strategic role does the United States expect South Korea to play?
WERTHEIM: I don’t think many people in the U.S. government expect South Korea to join a U.S.-led coalition to fight China. (Nor is it knowable whether the United States would fight China; “strategic ambiguity” isn’t just a policy but a real reflection of U.S. intention, or lack thereof.) Instead, South Korea would be expected to provide logistical support for allied forces and produce defense equipment to sustain the war effort. Most importantly, South Korea would need to assume the full burden of deterring North Korea even as some U.S. forces and assets on the Korean peninsula get diverted to the Taiwan theater.
KYUNGHYANG: I would like to ask about the Trump administration’s response to the recent tensions between China and Japan. While Prime Minister Takaichi’s comments about possible involvement in a Taiwan contingency may have been diplomatically awkward, they were broadly aligned with U.S. expectations regarding Japan’s security role. However, the Trump administration’s expressions of support for Japan were both muted in tone and notably delayed, giving the impression that Washington preferred to stand on the sidelines of this dispute.
WERTHEIM: The U.S. ambassador to Japan did express support for Japan and Takaichi, but Trump himself was muted. Trump’s response reflects his desire for stable relations with Beijing after the two countries had reached a fragile trade truce. In addition, Trump prefers to remain strictly ambiguous about how the United States itself would respond to a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. In the context of Taiwan as well as Ukraine, he seems to think it’s unwise for a weaker country to use inflammatory language that could provoke a stronger country. So it wouldn’t surprise me if Trump personally disapproved of Takaichi’s comments, which appeared to suggest that Japan would use military force if China used armed force to attack Taiwan.
Still, I don’t see a real change in U.S. policy so far. We’ll find out in the coming months if Trump and Xi are interested in reaching a new understanding about Taiwan.
성남학교폭력변호사 비아그라 지속시간 수원변호사 의정부음주운전변호사 의정부이혼전문변호사 조정이혼 승소사례 수원성추행변호사 이혼소송 성남성범죄전문변호사 개인회생렌트카 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳 안양이혼변호사 의정부법무법인 의정부소년사건변호사 상간녀위자료 수원음주운전변호사 인터넷가입 용인음주운전변호사 남양주법무법인 수원형사변호사 위자료 폰테크 유방암요양 이혼전문변호사 의정부형사전문변호사 수원성범죄변호사 신용불량자장기렌트 수원이혼변호사 서울암요양병원 수원불법촬영변호사 인터넷비교사이트 의정부이혼변호사 상간남소송 수원성범죄변호사 폰테크. 평택학교폭력변호사 이지렌트 인스타그램 팔로워 구매 의정부형사전문변호사 안양이혼전문변호사 평택이혼전문변호사 대전이혼전문변호사 수원강제추행변호사 의정부성범죄전문변호사 경주이혼전문변호사 인터넷비교사이트 인스타 팔로워 구매 평택이혼전문변호사 수원형사전문변호사 안양법무법인 의정부변호사 서울흥신소 분당불법촬영변호사 안양이혼전문변호사 재산분할 의정부이혼변호사 성남성범죄변호사 사이트 상위노출 이지렌트카 의정부성범죄변호사 저신용렌트 무심사장기렌트카 천안이혼전문변호사 마사지구인 네이버키워드광고 안산이혼변호사 인터넷티비현금많이주는곳 이혼전문변호사 수원개인회생 당일폰테크 명품레플리카 폰테크 용인의정부검사출신변호사 무심사무보증장기렌트 부천이혼전문변호사 인터넷가입 의정부의정부검사출신변호사 이혼변호사 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳 인스타그램 좋아요 안양상간소송변호사 수원음주운전변호사 성남이혼전문변호사 저신용장기렌트카 신차장기리스 성남음주운전변호사 수원검사출신변호사 비아그라 처방 암요양병원 안산이혼전문변호사 탐정사무소 이지렌터카 인천폰테크 알곤출장용접 포항이혼전문변호사 이혼전문변호사추천 폰테크 의정부성범죄전문변호사 수원이혼전문변호사 오산개인회생 이혼소송 서울이혼전문변호사 웹사이트 상위노출 울산이혼전문변호사 안양학교폭력변호사 성남학교폭력변호사 출장용접 청주이혼전문변호사 안산이혼전문변호사 웹사이트 상위노출 수원음주운전변호사 탐정사무소 의정부음주운전변호사 창원이혼전문변호사 수원소년범죄변호사 포항이혼전문변호사 수원상간녀변호사 의정부음주운전변호사 인터넷티비현금많이주는곳 천안이혼전문변호사 수원성범죄전문변호사 남양주법무법인 신불자장기렌트 수원법률사무소 분당강제추행변호사 출장용접 저신용장기렌트카 김해이혼전문변호사 마사지구인구직 AVMOOV 변호사 유튜브 구독자 구매 의정부음주운전변호사 수원법무법인 의정부변호사 장기렌트 수원이혼전문변호사 수원음주운전변호사 폰테크 인터넷비교사이트 의정부성범죄변호사 의정부이혼변호사 용인검사출신변호사 안양학교폭력변호사 조정이혼 카페뮤직 수원상간녀변호사 용인성추행변호사 피망머니상 수원대형로펌 수원상간소송변호사 인터넷가입 수원이혼전문변호사 성남이혼전문변호사 분당강간변호사 비아그라 효과 흥신소 수원성범죄전문변호사 평택학교폭력변호사 폰테크 의정부음주운전변호사 저신용장기렌트 폰테크 당일 폰테크 의정부촉법소년변호사 당일폰테크 수원이혼전문변호사 용인형사전문변호사 용인검사출신변호사 상조내구제 의정부이혼변호사 성남대형로펌 인천흥신소 의정부형사전문변호사 수원법률사무소 대구이혼전문변호사 안양이혼전문변호사 수원이혼전문변호사 의정부법무법인 서울탐정사무소 개인회생장기렌트 인터넷가입현금지원 수원음주운전변호사 당일폰테크 의정부이혼변호사 이지렌터카 수면음악 1시간 수원음주운전변호사 차장검사출신변호사 수원소년법전문변호사 용인성범죄변호사 용인상간소송변호사 출장용접 흥신소 위자료 인스타 좋아요 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳 성남학교폭력변호사 저신용장기렌트 화이자 비아그라 수원형사변호사 폰테크 수원불법촬영변호사 의정부성범죄전문변호사 무심사장기렌트카 요양병원 남양주대형로펌 수원형사전문변호사 인스타 좋아요 구매 인천흥신소 내구제 인터넷가입현금지원 수원강간변호사 폰테크 용인이혼변호사 인터넷가입현금지원 웹사이트 상위노출 구리학교폭력변호사 수원리딩방사기변호사 수면유도음악 10시간 폰테크 안양대형로펌 분당강간변호사 암요양병원> 의정부상간소송변호사 항암요양병원 성남성범죄변호사 포항이혼전문변호사 이혼전문변호사 안산학교폭력변호사 인터넷설치현금 수원형사변호사 용인불법촬영변호사 수원성추행변호사 양산이혼전문변호사 폰테크 의정부성범죄변호사 의정부이혼전문변호사 용인강간변호사 브랜드이모티콘 인터넷가입 안양상간소송변호사 저신용장기렌트카 수원법무법인 수원이혼전문변호사 검사출신변호사 남양주학교폭력변호사 수원강간변호사 빠른이혼 감성뮤직 수원성추행변호사 안양음주운전변호사 서울탐정사무소 분당성추행변호사 수원강간변호사 수원성범죄변호사 출장용접 피망머니상 포천학교폭력변호사 이혼소송 안양상간소송변호사 의정부학교폭력변호사 수원음주운전변호사 의정부소년범죄변호사 수원상간소송변호사 김해이혼전문변호사 성남법무법인 폰테크당일 인터넷비교사이트 용인불법촬영변호사 안산음주운전변호사 안양이혼변호사 신용회복중장기렌트 수원마약변호사 수원법무법인 상조내구제 수원법무법인 이혼상담 안산음주운전변호사 성남학교폭력변호사 출장용접 용인이혼전문변호사 폰테크 카페 평택이혼전문변호사 폰테크 저신용장기렌트 포천학교폭력변호사 수원이혼변호사 약 인터넷가입현금지원 성남상간소송변호사 인터넷설치현금 의정부검사출신변호사 안산이혼변호사 홈페이지 상위노출 양육권 저신용장기렌트카 평택학교폭력변호사 대구이혼전문변호사 하나복권 승소사례 인터넷비교사이트 한게임클래식 안산이혼전문변호사 저신용자렌트 폰테크 청주이혼전문변호사 용인불법촬영변호사 수원소년보호사건변호사 성남성범죄변호사 남성진변호사 의정부변호사 의정부이혼전문변호사 의정부이혼변호사 이혼전문변호사 안양이혼전문변호사 의정부검사출신변호사 경주이혼전문변호사 플레이리스트 의정부이혼변호사 의정부법무법인 수원형사전문변호사 네이버 사이트 상위노출 용인법무법인 비아그라 사이트 용인법무법인 안양상간소송변호사 용인음주운전변호사 한게임머니상 성남성범죄변호사 용인음주운전변호사 분당불법촬영변호사 수원성범죄변호사 수원검사출신변호사 안양상간소송변호사 수원이혼전문변호사 성남음주운전변호사 인터넷가입현금지원 대구이혼전문변호사 용인성추행변호사 성남음주운전변호사 수원형사변호사 포천학교폭력변호사 안양대형로펌 폰테크 서울이혼전문변호사 수원흥신소 상간녀변호사 랜덤채팅 안양상간소송변호사 의정부변호사 폰테크 수원불법촬영변호사 탐정사무소 수면유도음악 이혼소송 용인법무법인 폰테크 이혼전문변호사 이혼상담 수원이혼전문변호사 수원성범죄전문변호사 안양대형로펌 수원이혼전문변호사 협의이혼 무신용장기렌트 화이자 비아그라용인이혼변호사 수원형사전문변호사 광고대행사 비아그라 처방 안양이혼전문변호사 안양음주운전변호사 안양학교폭력변호사 수원형사전문변호사 수원이혼전문변호사 인스타 팔로워 늘리기 안산학교폭력변호사 용인음주운전변호사 수원성추행변호사 성남학교폭력변호사 성남상간소송변호사 안산음주운전변호사 위례요양병원 의정부이혼변호사 평택이혼전문변호사 수원변호사 이지렌트카 분당불법촬영변호사 무심사장기렌트카 성남상간소송변호사 용인상간소송변호사 창원이혼전문변호사 당일폰테크 인스타그램
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